# DeepMind says AI agents found two new weaknesses in legacy 1024-bit RSA. What it means and what to check

> Google DeepMind and cryptographers from UC San Diego and Inria say AI agents produced a theoretical ~1,600x better signature-forgery attack and a ~30x cheaper batch-factoring method for 1024-bit RSA within weeks. RSA-2048 is unaffected, but leftover 1024-bit keys now have less margin than assumed.

Published Nov 7, 2026 by TechMeasured Staff · AI · Canonical: https://techmeasured.com/ai/deepmind-ai-agents-rsa-1024-signature-forgery-batch-factoring-what-it-means

**Google DeepMind** said on November 6 that AI agents, working under human supervision, found **two new weaknesses in legacy 1024-bit RSA** in a matter of weeks. One is a much cheaper way to forge signatures when an attacker controls part of the signed data. The other cuts the cost of factoring many 1024-bit keys at once. According to Interesting Engineering and OfficeChai, the work was led by DeepMind's **Dj Dvijotham** and **Abhradeep Thakurta** with cryptographers **Nadia Heninger** (UC San Diego) and **Emmanuel Thomé** (Inria). DeepMind VP Pushmeet Kohli announced it on X.

Why it matters: this is new cryptanalysis, not just a faster computer. As reported, the agents came up with new algorithms, and better algorithms shrink a key's safety margin no matter how much hardware an attacker has. DeepMind's own framing, per the coverage, is that old hardness assumptions need continual re-testing. Kohli spoke of "the need to continuously reassess."

## The two results

**1. Signature padding protects less than assumed.** RSA signatures add padding to the data before signing. The researchers report that once an attacker controls roughly **half of the signed block or more**, padding adds almost no protection. Forging then becomes about as easy as against unpadded RSA.

- Validation ran in a sandbox against an **already-solved 1024-bit benchmark key** from earlier academic work. The agents' implementation reproduced the known result with **3.5x less CPU time**. It also used **under one-thousandth** of the compute needed to factor that key.
- For the harder case, where the attacker controls only a small piece such as a **32-byte hash**, DeepMind estimates its new algorithm is about **1,600x** better than the best known method for 1024-bit keys. Both outlets stress this figure is **theoretical**.

**2. Batch factoring gets cheaper.** If an attacker wants many RSA keys of the same size, a big upfront computation can be shared across all of them. The agents found a batch method with better asymptotic complexity than any previously known one. As reported, it cuts the average cost of each **additional** 1024-bit key by about **30x**. Neither outlet says it was run at scale.

## The human work it builds on

Heninger and Thomé are also co-authors of a September IACR ePrint paper, **"Forging 1024-bit RSA signatures in nearly SNFS time."** In that paper, a UC San Diego and Inria team actually forged 1024-bit RSA signatures without factoring the key. They used temporary access to a raw signing oracle, a hardware security module they drove through its API. It cost about **1,380 CPU core-years** with **2^32 oracle queries**, then about **180 core-years** per forged signature. The authors estimate that, in that oracle attack model, RSA is **15–30 bits weaker** than factoring-based estimates. They add that even 4096-bit RSA falls short of 128-bit security. The coverage we read doesn't say whether that paper supplied DeepMind's benchmark key. Either way, the trend is clear: practical attacks on RSA keep landing below the old estimates.

## What it does not mean

- **RSA-2048 and larger are not affected,** per DeepMind as reported. Banking, messaging and modern TLS are not broken.
- **No live system was attacked.** The forgery result was shown in simulation against a known key. The 1,600x figure is an estimate, not a demonstration.
- **We could not read DeepMind's own write-up or paper,** and the outlets don't name the model behind the agents. Treat the exact multipliers as DeepMind's claims until a paper is public.

## What to check

1024-bit RSA should already be gone, but it lingers. byteiota's audit checklist points to old embedded and IoT firmware signing, pre-2014 internal PKI, unrotated SSH keys, legacy VPN appliances and HSMs with fixed keys as likely hiding places.

```bash
# SSH key size (first number is bits)
ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
# Certificate or live TLS endpoint
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text | grep "Public-Key"
openssl s_client -connect host:443 </dev/null 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -text | grep "Public-Key"
```

Replace anything reporting **1024 bit**. Use Ed25519 for SSH, and ECDSA P-256 or RSA-3072+ for certificates and signing keys. Do **fleets first**: the batch-factoring result matters most where many same-size keys exist, such as device fleets and certificate pools. And if you are planning a post-quantum migration anyway, this is one more reason not to stretch RSA's lifetime.


## Sources

1. [Interesting Engineering — Google DeepMind finds 1,600x faster way to expose encryption flaws](https://interestingengineering.com/ai-robotics/1600x-faster-google-deepmind-agents-expose-weaknesses-in-older-encryption-methods)
2. [OfficeChai — Google DeepMind says it has used AI agents to break legacy RSA-1024 encryption faster than anyone thought possible](https://officechai.com/ai/google-deepmind-says-it-has-used-ai-agents-to-break-legacy-rsa-1024-encryption-faster-than-anyone-thought-possible/)
3. [IACR ePrint 2026/2131 — Forging 1024-bit RSA signatures in nearly SNFS time (Shea, Haller, Suhl, Heninger, Thomé)](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2131)
4. [byteiota — DeepMind AI found new RSA-1024 weaknesses: audit now](https://byteiota.com/deepmind-ai-rsa-1024-weaknesses/)
