# pip CVE-2026-133949: older pip still trusts the root behind eMudhra's crackable CA keys. Upgrade pip now

> The Python Software Foundation has given a CVE and a 9.3 score to the fact that pip before 26.2.2 ships a certificate bundle that still trusts the root behind eMudhra's eight compromised CA keys. The fix has been on PyPI for a month, but many images, CI runners and Python installers still carry older pip. Here is what changed and what to update.

Published Nov 22, 2026 by TechMeasured Staff · Security · Canonical: https://techmeasured.com/security/pip-cve-2026-133949-bundled-certifi-trusts-emudhra-root-upgrade-pip-26-3-what-to-do

The Python Software Foundation published **CVE-2026-133949** on November 20. It covers every version of **pip before 26.2.2**: the certificate bundle pip carries inside it (a vendored copy of `certifi`) still trusts the eMudhra root behind October's compromised CA keys. The PSF, which is the CNA for pip, scores it **9.3 (critical) under CVSS 4.0**, with network attack, no privileges and no user action needed.

Why it matters: pip fetches and installs code. If a client trusts a certificate an attacker can forge, someone who can intercept the traffic could pose as a package index or download host. The fixed pip has been on PyPI since **October 20**. Many Docker base images, CI runners, virtualenvs and Python installers still ship older pip, and pip doesn't update itself. The CVE flags those copies to scanners for the first time.

## The eMudhra background, briefly

On October 17, researchers told the browser root programs that eight eMudhra intermediate CA keys (six TLS, two code-signing, all in the "G3B/G3C" family) were **weak enough to recompute from public certificates**. Mozilla's bug shows the P-384 private keys were tiny integers. The Hacker News quotes Google's view that anyone could derive them. Browsers blocked them between October 17 and 20, and eMudhra revoked them on October 18.

The TLS intermediates chain up to **emSign ECC Root CA - G3**. Endor Labs pointed out that the real gap was non-browser clients with their **own bundled trust stores**: Go, Node.js, Electron, Composer, certifi and, through certifi, pip.

The story kept growing. On November 11, The Hacker News reported that eMudhra had also revoked **eight RSA intermediates** (G2B/G2C) that it had first called unaffected. Their keys went through the same flawed handling, though eMudhra said it could not show they were actually broken. eMudhra says it knows of **no misuse**. Its TLS roots are being phased out: Microsoft from November 16, and Apple ends trust in emSign Root CA - G1 on November 30.

## What we found inside the pip wheels

We downloaded the pip wheels from PyPI and compared the certifi bundles inside them.

| pip version | On PyPI since | Bundled certifi | emSign roots trusted |
|---|---|---|---|
| 26.2.1 | Aug 4, 2026 | 2026.06.17 | G1, **ECC G3**, C1, ECC C3 |
| **26.2.2** (fix) | Oct 20, 2026 | 2026.10.19 | G1, C1, ECC C3 |
| **26.3** (latest) | Nov 2, 2026 | 2026.10.23 | G1 only |

The only changes between 26.2.1 and 26.2.2 are the certifi bump and pip's version number. That bump drops **emSign ECC Root CA - G3**, the root the compromised intermediates chain to. pip 26.3 drops two more emSign roots. None of the three bundles contains the Sectigo "AAA Certificate Services" root that also cross-signed the bad intermediates, so that path wasn't open through pip.

**Why pip's bundle matters even if your OS is patched:** pip 26.2.2 builds its TLS context with `truststore`, so it uses the operating system's store. Then it *also* loads its own certifi file on top. So a root your OS has removed is still trusted by an old pip. (We read this in pip 26.2.2's source, `pip/_internal/cli/index_command.py`.)

## Python itself has a second fix

Separately, CPython added a **denylist of known-compromised certificates** to the `ssl` module. It rejects them whatever the `SSLContext` settings, and it's tracked as **CVE-2026-115557** (Seth Larson's October 24 announcement, forwarded to oss-security). The pip CVE record says pip isn't vulnerable on a Python that rejects the compromised certificates.

We couldn't read Python's own advisory or release notes, so we can't give you the full list of fixed upstream versions. Debian's tracker lists fixed packages **3.13.18-1, 3.14.10-1 and 3.15.2-1** in unstable. Its stable releases are still marked unfixed, and Debian rates the issue "unimportant".

## Exploitation status

The CVE is **not** in CISA's KEV catalogue. CISA's SSVC entry says "exploitation: none". VulDB rates it much lower than the PSF, at 3.7 under CVSS 3.1, and calls exploitation difficult. An attacker would need a network position between you and the index *and* a forged certificate that pip's chain checks accept. Treat the 9.3 as a measure of the impact if that happens, not as a sign of attacks.

## What to do

1. **Upgrade pip everywhere it lives**, not just on your laptop:

   ```bash
   python -m pip install --upgrade "pip>=26.2.2"   # 26.3 drops more emSign roots
   python -m pip --version
   ```

2. **Check the bundle directly** if you're unsure which pip an image carries:

   ```bash
   python -c "import pip._vendor.certifi as c, pathlib; t = pathlib.Path(c.where()).read_text(); print(c.__version__, t.count('emSign ECC Root CA - G3'))"
   ```

   On PyPI's 26.2.1 wheel this prints `2026.06.17 3`. You want a count of `0`. Ideally the version is `2026.10.19` or later too, but in our sandbox a repackaged pip 26.2.1 build reported the old certifi version with the root already removed. So the count is the more reliable test.

3. **Rebuild base images and CI runners** instead of patching running containers. Fresh virtualenvs get pip from `ensurepip`, so update your Python build too.
4. **Pin standalone certifi** as well (`certifi>=2026.10.19`, per Endor Labs). `requests` and many other libraries use it, separately from pip's private copy.
5. **Patch Python** to a build with the `ssl` denylist when your distribution ships one. Update OS `ca-certificates` (`apt-get install --only-upgrade ca-certificates` or `apk upgrade ca-certificates`).
6. **Don't "fix" TLS errors** with `--trusted-host` or by turning off verification. If an internal mirror uses an eMudhra certificate, replace that certificate.

## What to watch

Python's list of fixed releases. eMudhra's full incident report, which is under KPMG review with a December 4 deadline. Apple's November 30 cut-off for emSign Root CA - G1, the one emSign root still in pip 26.3 and in standalone certifi 2026.11.20.


## Sources

1. [OpenCVE — CVE-2026-133949 (CNA record from the PSF)](https://app.opencve.io/cve/CVE-2026-133949)
2. [ThreatInt — CVE-2026-133949](https://cve.threatint.com/CVE/CVE-2026-133949)
3. [The Hacker News — Eight eMudhra CA keys compromised, triggering emergency fixes across browsers and software](https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/eight-emudhra-ca-keys-compromised.html)
4. [Endor Labs — eMudhra intermediate CA compromise: the trust stores you patched and the ones you didn't know you had](https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/emudhra-intermediate-ca-compromise-the-trust-stores-you-patched-and-the-ones-you-didnt-know-you-had)
5. [The Hacker News — eMudhra revokes 8 more CAs it previously declared unaffected](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/emudhra-revokes-8-more-cas-it.html)
6. [oss-security — Python ssl module denylist for compromised certificates (CVE-2026-115557)](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/24/5)
7. [Debian security tracker — CVE-2026-115557](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-115557)
8. [Mozilla Bugzilla — 2083449: eMudhra private key compromise of intermediate certificates](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2083449)
9. [PyPI — pip package metadata (JSON API)](https://pypi.org/pypi/pip/json)
