# Attackers used Qubole's own AWS account to walk into customer clouds and take secrets and S3 data. How to check yours

> Wiz says someone used credentials for Qubole's AWS account to assume the IAM roles customers had set up for the data platform, then took Secrets Manager values, Lambda variables and whole S3 buckets. Many of those roles had been left behind after customers stopped using Qubole. Here's what to search for in CloudTrail and what to lock down.

Published Nov 10, 2026 by TechMeasured Staff · Security · Canonical: https://techmeasured.com/security/qubole-aws-cross-account-roles-abused-secrets-s3-stolen-how-to-check-cloudtrail

An attacker got hold of credentials for the AWS account that Qubole, the Idera-owned data lake platform, uses to reach into its customers' clouds. Between October 14 and 26 they used that access to assume customers' Qubole integration roles and steal secrets and S3 data, according to research by cloud security firm Wiz reported by [The Hacker News](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hackers-exploit-quboles-trusted-aws.html). Sentra spotted the activity and alerted Wiz; Google's Mandiant also investigated, [Dataconomy](https://dataconomy.com/2026/11/10/hackers-use-qubole-aws-credentials-to-breach-customer/) reports.

This is a supply-chain attack that needed no break-in at any victim. Customers had told AWS to trust Qubole's account, and the attacker simply came in as Qubole. Many of the roles they used had sat idle for months, some after the customer had stopped using Qubole, and still had broad read access. Any company that has ever connected Qubole to AWS should check its logs back to October 1.

## How it worked

Qubole runs compute inside customers' AWS accounts. To set it up, a customer creates an IAM role whose trust policy lets Qubole's AWS account assume it, with an External ID that Qubole supplies. The attacker had credentials for Qubole's account. How they got them hasn't been disclosed.

- **The External ID didn't stop anything.** Wiz saw every attacker request carry a valid External ID. AWS doesn't treat the value as a secret, and it shows up in plain text in CloudTrail and in setup files.
- **They harvested credentials first.** In the accounts Wiz examined, the attacker read Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager values and SSM Parameter Store entries. Sentra also found credentials taken from EC2 user data, [GBHackers](https://gbhackers.com/quboles-trusted-aws-access/) reports.
- **They tested what they found.** The attacker ran TruffleHog to check stolen AWS keys, Microsoft Entra ID client secrets and Okta client credentials, and requested OAuth tokens with the Okta credentials, per Dataconomy.
- **Then they took data in bulk.** Using the roles' S3 access, the attacker listed and downloaded objects, sometimes entire buckets in one session. Sentra reported millions of files taken from one company's accounts, according to GBHackers.

Qubole's own setup guide includes a sample S3 policy that lets the role read every bucket in the account, The Hacker News notes.

## How big, and who did it

Nobody has given an exact count. Sentra said more than a dozen organizations were breached, and the wider impact involved dozens of Qubole customers, GBHackers reports. Wiz hasn't tied the campaign to a known group and called it opportunistic. Separately, from October 8 to 11, someone abused customer-owned AWS access keys that Wiz believes were set up for Qubole. Wiz couldn't link that activity to the main campaign.

Wiz also found a bootable Linux image called `sso_agent.iso` on the attacker's OVH server. It polls TCP port 23458 for shell scripts and loads the `ntfs3` driver, which suggests an interest in Windows disks, GBHackers reports. No confirmed deployments have been found.

Neither Qubole nor Idera had posted a statement when The Hacker News checked, and Qubole and AWS didn't respond to Dataconomy. Wiz didn't say whether the stolen credentials had been disabled.

## What to search for

Start your CloudTrail search on **October 1, 2026**. These indicators come from Wiz, as reported by The Hacker News and GBHackers:

| Indicator | What it means |
|---|---|
| `AssumeRole` with `userIdentity.accountId` = `805246085872` from a non-AWS IP | Qubole's account, used from outside AWS. Wiz says legitimate Qubole traffic came only from AWS |
| IAM principal `AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS` | Seen only in attacker activity |
| IAM principal `AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW` from outside AWS | Qubole also uses this one legitimately; attacker use began October 18 |
| Role session names starting `quiam-` (e.g. `quiam-enum`, `quiam-scope-full`) | Attacker reconnaissance sessions |
| `57.129.54[.]120`, `2001:41d0:70d[:]7800::` | OVH-hosted attacker infrastructure |
| `45.83.220[.]211`, `185.209.199[.]73`, `89.37.63[.]175` | Mullvad VPN exits. Shared with other users, so not proof on their own |
| TruffleHog user agent on `GetCallerIdentity` | Stolen keys being tested. Check your Entra ID and Okta sign-in logs too |

Note that CloudTrail management events show the role assumptions and bucket listings but not which objects were read. Several victims had no S3 data events or server access logs, so they couldn't tell what was taken.

## What to do

1. **If a Qubole role was assumed, rotate everything it could reach.** That means every secret, parameter and Lambda variable, plus any Entra ID, Okta or cloud keys stored in them. Then **revoke the role's active sessions**. Rotating a credential doesn't end temporary sessions already issued.
2. **Delete Qubole roles you don't use**, or remove Qubole's account from their trust policies.
3. **Narrow the trust.** Replace the account-wide `:root` principal with the specific IAM principal the vendor uses, where supported. Add an `aws:SourceIp` or `aws:SourceVpce` condition. Wiz says a source IP condition alone would have blocked every role assumption it observed.
4. **Don't rely on External IDs.** Change them after an incident and use a unique one per role.
5. **Cut what vendor roles can read.** Look hard at Secrets Manager, SSM, Lambda configuration and account-wide S3 reads.
6. **Fix your logging.** Use an organization-wide trail across all regions, and turn on S3 data events or server access logs for sensitive buckets.
7. **Alert on vendor role assumptions** that arrive from VPNs or unfamiliar hosting providers.

## What to watch

How the attacker got Qubole's credentials, whether they've been revoked, and whether Idera notifies customers. Many SaaS tools use the same trust model, so steps 2–5 apply well beyond Qubole.


## Sources

1. [The Hacker News — Hackers Exploit Qubole's Trusted AWS Access to Breach Customer Accounts and Steal Data](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hackers-exploit-quboles-trusted-aws.html)
2. [GBHackers — Hackers Abuse Qubole's Trusted AWS Access to Breach Multiple Cloud Accounts and Steal Sensitive Data](https://gbhackers.com/quboles-trusted-aws-access/)
3. [Dataconomy — Hackers Use Qubole AWS Credentials To Breach Customer Cloud Environments](https://dataconomy.com/2026/11/10/hackers-use-qubole-aws-credentials-to-breach-customer/)
