# wfx-loot: hijacked GitHub accounts probed 61,764 repos and ran a CI secret stealer in 1,800+. What to check

> Since November 10, an attacker using 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts has been slipping a self-deleting credential stealer into GitHub Actions workflows, then planting AWS and Azure backdoors that survive secret rotation. If you maintain repositories, here is how to tell whether it ran on yours.

Published Nov 15, 2026 by TechMeasured Staff · Security · Canonical: https://techmeasured.com/security/wfx-loot-github-actions-secret-stealer-4837-accounts-61764-repos-what-to-check

**An attacker holding stolen tokens for 4,837 GitHub accounts has spent the past five days pushing a credential stealer into GitHub Actions workflows, according to researchers at application-security firm Aikido, who named the campaign wfx-loot.** Aikido counted probe pull requests in **61,764 repositories** and says the payload actually ran in **at least 1,835** of them, as reported by [BleepingComputer](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-compromise-4-800-github-accounts-to-steal-cloud-credentials/) and [Help Net Security](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/12/wfx-loot-github-actions-secret-stealer/). BleepingComputer lists accounts linked to Fortune 100 companies, the US General Services Administration, the French government, Nextcloud and WebdriverIO among those hit.

This matters beyond the raw numbers for two reasons. First, the stealer **deletes its own workflow runs and logs within about a minute**, so a repository that looks clean may not be. Second, it tries to plant **cloud backdoors that keep working after you rotate secrets**. If you only rotate keys, you may still be exposed. Researchers say this is not a GitHub vulnerability: the attacker is using valid stolen tokens, including bot accounts that can get around branch protection. No CVE applies.

## How the attack works

Researchers describe three stages:

| Stage | What happens |
|---|---|
| Probe | A pull request titled **"docs: dependency audit notes"** from a branch named **`wfx-docs`** checks whether the stolen token can write. Aikido says 92% of these PRs were still open, so owners mostly hadn't noticed |
| Payload | A shell script of roughly 1,500 lines is added to an existing workflow, hidden as a `.ci-*.sh` file run by an npm `postinstall` hook, or placed in a new workflow on a throwaway `chore/` branch |
| Cleanup | The change is reverted and the workflow run and its logs are deleted, usually within a minute |

Help Net Security reports that 10,431 of the probe PRs hit repositories the hijacked account didn't own, reached through collaborator or organisation access. The campaign began at about 12:45 UTC on November 10, according to BleepingComputer.

## What it steals and what it leaves behind

According to the reports, the script collects:

- GitHub tokens and Actions secrets, plus runner memory;
- AWS, Azure and GCP credentials, including from self-hosted runners' instance metadata;
- SSH keys, Git, Docker, Kubernetes, npm, PyPI, Vault and Terraform credentials, and shell histories;
- API keys for AI services including OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Hugging Face, Cursor and GitHub Copilot.

It then tries to move into cloud accounts. It exchanges GitHub OIDC tokens for temporary cloud sessions, creates long-lived AWS access keys, rewrites an AWS role's trust policy to accept **any** AWS account, and adds federated identity credentials to Azure applications. Help Net Security notes those Azure credentials survive token rotation. It can also forge passing status checks to get past branch protection.

Data first went to attacker servers over HTTP. [CyberExperts](https://cyberexperts.com/2026-11-13-github-wfx-loot-actions-secret-stealer/), citing StepSecurity, reports that from about 05:30 UTC on November 12 newer copies began sending data to a Telegram chat instead.

Some poisoned code reached package registries through automated publishing: **Packagist `digitalelvis/neuronai-studio` 3.14.3** and Go module **`github.com/onuragtas/docker-env` v1.0.278 and v1.0.280**. In the Go module the payload sits only in a workflow file, which Go builds don't run. Aikido says at least 50 compromised accounts can publish to npm, PyPI, Go, crates or Packagist, so watch for more.

Aikido found overlap with October's GhostAction campaign. Accounts hit by GhostAction were much more likely to be hit again, and wfx-loot was injected into GhostAction's own workflow files in more than 100 repositories. Even so, Aikido thinks they are probably different actors. None of the reports we read includes a statement from GitHub.

## Indicators to search for

| Type | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Branch | `wfx-docs`; new short-lived `chore/` branches |
| PR title | "docs: dependency audit notes" |
| Commit titles | "ci: refresh build cache", "chore: add ci helper", "chore: add dependency audit workflow" |
| Files | hidden `.ci-*.sh` scripts; unexpected `postinstall` hooks |
| Collection servers | 194.150.166.244, 18.143.168.96, 153.75.82.159 (port 8080), per CyberExperts |
| AWS | trust policies with `"Principal": {"AWS": "*"}`; new access keys; CloudTrail sessions named `wfx-*` followed by `CreateAccessKey` or `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` |
| Azure | federated identity credentials named `wfx-ci-*` |

## What to do

1. **Search your org since November 10** for the PR title, the `wfx-docs` branch and the commit titles above. Close and report the probe PRs.
2. **Look for gaps in Actions run numbers** right after a suspicious commit. Because the stealer deletes its runs, a missing number is the clearest sign it executed.
3. **If it ran, treat every secret, publishing token and cloud role the workflow could reach as compromised**, not just the ones the script names. Rotate them all.
4. **Clean up cloud persistence separately.** Rotation alone won't remove it. Audit AWS role trust policies and access keys, check CloudTrail for `wfx-*` sessions, and delete any Azure `wfx-ci-*` federated credentials.
5. **Revoke the pushing account's tokens, OAuth grants and SSH keys**, including bot accounts, and turn on 2FA and fine-grained tokens where you can.
6. **Check `composer.lock` and `go.sum`** for the package versions above. Treat any machine that installed or opened the Packagist package as compromised.
7. **Check for merges that passed on a status check CI never actually ran.**

Expect the numbers to grow. The attacker's configuration includes settings for private repositories, which Aikido notes its researchers may not be able to see.


## Sources

1. [Help Net Security — Check your GitHub repos: A secret stealer hit tens of thousands of them](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/12/wfx-loot-github-actions-secret-stealer/)
2. [BleepingComputer — Hackers compromise 4,800 GitHub accounts to steal cloud credentials](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-compromise-4-800-github-accounts-to-steal-cloud-credentials/)
3. [CyberExperts — wfx-loot: Stolen GitHub Tokens Push CI Secret Stealer to 61,764 Repos](https://cyberexperts.com/2026-11-13-github-wfx-loot-actions-secret-stealer/)
4. [WindowsForum — wfx-loot GitHub Actions Attack: Check Stolen Secrets and Azure and AWS Persistence](https://windowsforum.com/news/wfx-loot-github-actions-attack-check-stolen-secrets-and-azure-and-aws-persistence.452079/)
