Subscribe
0%
Illustration for: ScreenConnect attacks via RMM+ extensions hit 288 endpoints at 48 organizations: what MSPs should check now

ScreenConnect attacks via RMM+ extensions hit 288 endpoints at 48 organizations: what MSPs should check now

An attacker used third-party RMM+ extensions in cloud ScreenConnect panels to push rogue remote-access clients to managed endpoints in about 90 minutes. ConnectWise disabled five extensions in roughly 400 partner environments, but that doesn't remove access the attacker already planted.

Listen to this article0:00 / 4:54

An attacker abused third-party extensions in cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect panels on November 11 to install attacker-controlled copies of ScreenConnect on at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organizations, according to Huntress research reported by The Hacker News. ConnectWise responded by disabling five extensions across about 400 partner environments.

This matters because ScreenConnect is the remote-support tool many managed service providers (MSPs) use to reach every customer machine they look after. One compromised panel can push commands to hundreds of PCs at once. The rogue clients also keep working after the original entry point is closed, so switching off the extensions doesn't make a provider safe.

What happened

Item Detail
Start of activity About 17:47 UTC on November 11 (Huntress, via The Hacker News and Field Effect)
Speed About a third of machines reached within 10 minutes, all within about 90 minutes (CyberScoop)
Confirmed impact At least 288 endpoints at 48 organizations (Huntress)
ConnectWise action Confirmed the activity and disabled five extensions at 22:45 UTC (Field Effect)
Exposure About 400 partner environments had at least one of the extensions installed. ConnectWise says having one installed doesn't mean you were compromised

The five disabled extensions are Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. ConnectWise describes them as independently developed. It says it has found no compromise of its own infrastructure and no vulnerability in ScreenConnect itself, and that the initial access method and full scope are still under investigation.

Why the extension was the weak point

CyberScoop reports that RMM+ lets other tools manage ScreenConnect sessions without anyone using the console. It skips ScreenConnect's user accounts, roles and multi-factor authentication and checks a shared access key instead. Huntress found that in versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 that key defaulted to blank, so the check accepted an empty value if no key had been set.

Most installs Huntress reviewed looked legitimate: added for a project, then never removed. Field Effect adds a visibility problem: commands run through the extension were logged against the extension, not a technician login, so they were easy to miss.

What SCKit does

Huntress named the toolkit SCKit. According to The Hacker News and Field Effect, it:

  • uses ScreenConnect's Run Command feature to install a rogue ScreenConnect client, stops the real one and puts the attacker's copy in its place;
  • adds Microsoft Defender exclusions and creates a scheduled task called TrapWatch;
  • tries to steal a technician's .aspxauth session cookie when they connect to an infected machine, replays it against the panel, and pushes a payload through the Shared Toolbox to every endpoint that technician can reach. The Toolbox item is deleted about 60 seconds later.

Huntress says that last step failed in every recovered host log it has checked so far. The attacker numbers each victim MSP, and the numbers start partway through the sequence, which suggests earlier victims. Huntress also says parts of the code look LLM-generated. Sophos has reported the same technique coming from three ScreenConnect instance IDs.

Cybersecurity Dive notes that Blackpoint links part of the toolkit's behaviour to CVE-2026-84869, a ScreenConnect flaw added to CISA's exploited-vulnerabilities catalog in September. Researchers haven't confirmed it was used in this campaign. Nobody has named the attacker.

What to do now

  1. Disable all five extensions on every instance. ConnectWise could only switch them off where it had access. On-premises partners have to do it themselves.
  2. Check Run Command history even if nothing alerted. Huntress gives this advice because of the gap in the victim numbering. Also review Shared Toolbox activity, extension installs, admin actions and authentication logs.
  3. Investigate endpoints without ScreenConnect. Use EDR live response, WinRM or another tool so technicians don't open sessions to infected hosts, which is how SCKit tries to spread.
  4. Hunt for persistence: unknown ScreenConnect clients, the TrapWatch task, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, RelayTrapLiteAlert registry entries, and scripts such as sckit-run.bat, sckit-decoder.ps1 and TrapWatch.ps1.
  5. Block the published indicators. These include 185.99.255[.]28, 155.94.150[.]39 and the domain ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev. The Hacker News reproduces ConnectWise's fuller list.
  6. Contain from a clean workstation. End active sessions, rotate ScreenConnect credentials, enforce MFA, and preserve logs before cleaning up.
  7. Watch for reinfection. Field Effect says some hosts were reinfected soon after going back into service.

If you buy IT support from an MSP, ask them whether they ran any of these extensions and whether they've checked their Run Command history since November 11.

Sources

  1. The Hacker News — ScreenConnect Attacks Target at Least 288 Endpoints Across 48 Organizations With Rogue Clients thehackernews.com
  2. Cybersecurity Dive (via Yahoo News) — ConnectWise disables third-party extensions as it probes cyberattack targeting ScreenConnect users yahoo.com
  3. CyberScoop — Rogue remote-access campaign spread through ScreenConnect add-on, researchers say cyberscoop.com
  4. Field Effect — SCKit campaign targets MSP ScreenConnect environments fieldeffect.com

#ConnectWise#ScreenConnect#MSP#SCKit#Huntress#remote access#supply chain